Securing voters' privacy and ensuring the integrity of the voting process are major design goals in voting systems. We propose secure voting protocols for two families of voting rules -score-based rules and order-based rules. This is the first study that considers the question of secure multiparty computation of election results that such voting rules determine. The protocols output the winning candidate(s) while preserving the privacy of the voters and the secrecy of the ballots. They offer perfect secrecy in the sense that apart from their desired output, all other information is kept secret, including the ballots, intermediate values, the final score received by each candidate, and the final ranking of candidates. This, in turn, decreases the opportunities for voters to vote strategically. Our protocols are designed to deal with both semihonest and rational voters. Voters of both types follow the protocol's specifications, but at the same time they try to infer information on the input of other voters from the messages which they receive during the protocol's run. While semi-honest voters submit legal votes, rational voters may submit illegal inputs in attempt to help their candidate of choice. Our protocols involve D ≥ 1 independent talliers who perform the tallying procedure on encrypted and secret-shared ballots in order to prevent them access to the actual ballots. Our protocols are collision-secure, in the sense that no party, either a voter or a tallier, can get any access to the ballots or any other intermediate results, unless all D talliers collude with at least one of the voters. We analyze the protocols' privacy-preservation and communication and computational costs, and show that they are compliant with the common desiderata of secure e-voting systems.
Introduction
Ballot secrecy is an essential goal in the design of voting systems. When voters are concerned for their privacy, they might decide to vote strategically, i.e., vote differently from their real preferences, or even abstain from voting altogether.
Our focus in this paper is on preserving privacy and achieving perfect ballot secrecy. The usual meaning of privacy in the context of secure voting is that the voters remain anonymous. Namely, even though the ballots are known (as is the case when opening the ballot box at the end of an election day), no ballot can be traced back to the voter who cast it. We go one step further and consider perfect ballot secrecy, or full privacy [15] . The latter property means that, given any coalition of voters, the protocol does not reveal any information on the ballots, beyond what can be inferred by the coalition from the final (published) voting outcome and their own vote.
Motivating examples
Consider for example a group of faculty members who need to jointly decide which applicant to accept to the faculty out of a given list of candidates. Towards that end, each faculty member (voter) casts a ballot. A tallier counts the ballots and uses some voting rule to calculate the outcome. The tallier then pronounces the name of the elected candidate(s). For example, using the simple plurality rule, each ballot indicates a single candidate, and the winning candidate is the one who was elected by the largest number of voters. The problem with this common voting strategy is that even though voters cast their ballots anonymously and, consequently, the tallier cannot link voters to ballots, he does see the actual ballots. Hence, besides the final outcome, say, that Alice is the elected candidate, the tallier is exposed to additional information which may be sensitive; e.g., that the candidate Bob received no votes, even though some of the voters declared upfront that they are going to vote for him.
As another example, the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) 1 is the benchmark interest rate at which banks can borrow from each other. The rate is computed daily; banks that are benchmark submitters contribute to setting the LIBOR by means of voting: each bank's "vote" is an interest rate and the LIBOR is determined by some averaging over the submitted votes. The bank's submitted rate may signal the bank's financial viability. Worrying about the signal which their submitted rate conveys, some banks may submit an untruthful rate. To prevent this, the bank's individual submissions (the ballots) are kept private and are published only three months after the submission date. However, the tallier is exposed to these ballots and may be able to link some ballots to banks by financial analysis. Therefore, even anonymous ballots might not provide sufficient privacy.
On voter types
We propose secure multiparty protocols to compute the election results of some of the most well-known voting rules. We consider two types of voters: semi-honest and rational. Both types of voters follow the protocol's specifications correctly, but at the same time they try to infer information on the input of other voters from the messages which they receive during the protocol's run.
Herein, we follow the terminology which is common in cryptography and game theory literature. We refer to voters as semi-honest if they always submit legal votes. We do not care herein whether those legal votes reflect their truthful preferences or whether they vote strategically (see more on that in Section 1.3). On the other hand, voters who might submit illegal votes in attempt to help their candidate of choice are referred to as rational. Our voting protocols include probabilistic mechanisms to detect illegal votes and, consequently, provide proofs against such voters in order to enable their punishment. Such voters are called rational since they are aware of the detection and punishment mechanism and they will choose to be fraudulent only if their expected utility from such a fraud is higher than the utility that they expect to have in case they act truthfully.
We note that our terminology differs from the one used in computational social choice literature. In particular, in computational social choice literature rational voters are ones that submit legal votes that do not reflect their true intentions. As explained above, we adopt herein the terminology which is common in cryptography and game theory literature and therefore we consider such voters as semi-honest.
On strategic voting
One approach to deal with issues raised by our motivating examples (Section 1.1) is to accept the lack of privacy and to assume that some (or even all) of the voters' preferences may be inferred or estimated. However, this approach gives rise to another difficulty: given that the voters' preferences are known, all voting rules can be manipulated [34, 63] . In other words, if a voter knows other voters' preferences (and knows which voting rule is used), he has an incentive to vote strategically, i.e., to "manipulate" the election results by misrepresenting his preferences. (Hence, as explained in Section 1.2, strategic voters are semi-honest voters who submit a legal but non-truthful vote, in the hope of manipulating the election's results.) Alas, if voters distort their preferences, the elected candidate may be different from the candidate who would have won if all voters had voted truthfully.
Strategic voting is of particular concern in sequential voting settings [19, 26, 80] . In these settings, not all of the voters cast their ballots simultaneously, and intermediate results are published. For example, in the US primaries the voting lasts several months, and at each stage the intermediate results are known. As another example, when voters are dispersed across several time zones, voters in the west already know how voters in the east have voted, allowing for strategic voting.
Strategic voting cannot be totally eliminated, since we cannot secure the voting environment; indeed, voters may still learn of other voters' intentions via polls (in large-scale elections) or by private discussions (in small-scale elections). Thus, we cannot claim that the actual number of actions of strategic voting will be reduced. However, the secure voting protocols which we present here reduce the information available for the voters; hence, they reduce the grounds which could have potentially nourished strategic voting. Our protocols achieve that by providing ballot secrecy (i.e., the ballots remain encrypted and, as a result, not even the tallier can see the actual votes/ballots), and by protecting intermediate results. By the latter property we mean that only the winning candidates are published; their ranking or their aggregated scores or any other intermediate computational result remain hidden (to all parties), unless specifically requested.
The protecting of intermediate results is of particular importance in sequential voting. The tallier can compute an encryption of the intermediate results and then delete the ballots that were already cast. The tallier keeps those encrypted results (which he cannot decrypt) protected until the next batch of ballots is received and can be merged into them. Only after all ballots are received, the tallier may complete the aggregation and complete the computation of the election's result according to the underlying voting rule. In that process, not even the tallier is exposed to intermediate results, and the chances of hacking are minimized since only the aggregated results should be stored at each point in time (and not all the ballots that determined them).
On the tallier
Some systems for secure voting assume a tallier who is fully trusted. Namely, not only is he trusted to act honestly, in the sense of correctly aggregating the ballots and publishing the true election results, he is also trusted not to misuse the ballot information that he receives. As explained in Sections 1.1 and 1.3, there is a lot to gain from reducing the trust in the tallier to the first ingredient only; namely, to trust the tallier to act honestly, but keep the content of the ballots secret from him. In particular, such ballot secrecy can motivate more voters to vote according to their true preferences
The assumption of semi-honesty is very common in literature on secure multiparty protocols and privacy-preserving distributed computations. It is justified by the fact that in practical deployments of such protocols, the software running the protocol is authenticated and thus cannot be hacked and manipulated. In the case of a mediator, such as the tallier in our application setting, he typically has no incentive to cheat since then he risks losing the trust vested in him and then losing the reputation on which his business or public status depend. Such a model, of a third party that assists in performing computations in a multi-agent environment and is trusted to do so honestly, but at the same time is not allowed access to private inputs of the agents is known in cryptography as "the mediated model", see e.g. [3, 4, 64] .
Parties that deviate from the protocol's specifications (in order to gain more information on other parties' inputs, or in order to prevent other parties from getting the correct output) are called in the cryptographic literature malicious. Safeguarding against malicious parties results in less practical protocols. Because of that, and because the assumption of correctly following the prescribed protocol is justified in practical deployments (as explained above), the bulk of studies that deal with mutliparty computations, especially those that focus on specific real-life applications, assume semi-honest parties. Examples include studies on distributed association rule mining [45, 65, 71, 78, 84] , anonymization of distributed datasets [44, 73, 75, 85] , collaborative filtering [43, 67, 81] , distributed constraint optimization problems [37, 38, 48, 74, 76, 77] , distributed graph mining [5] and more.
Our contributions
We propose protocols for secure voting with perfect ballot secrecy. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
(1) We propose secure multiparty protocols for computing election's results, as determined by two families of voting rules; to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study that offers such protocols. The first family of voting rules that we consider are score-based rules. In those rules, a voter's ballot consists of scores given to each of the candidates, and the winner is the candidate with the highest aggregated score. This family includes the PLURALITY, APPROVAL, VETO, BORDA, and RANGE voting rules [55] . The second family consists of rules where the voter submits an ordered list of preferences. We follow the terminology used by Brandt and Sandholm [12] and call these rules order-based voting rules (a.k.a pairwise-comparison rules). In our discussion we cover two specific rules in this family -COPELAND [22] and MAXIMIN (a.k.a KRAMER-SIMPSON) [47, 68] .
(2) Our protocols are designed to reveal only the final election results, namely, which candidate (or candidates) won the election, and nothing beyond that. In our protocols, the voters send shares of their votes, under encryption, to a set of D external talliers. The talliers then perform oblivious computations over the encrypted ballot shares in order to find the candidates that should be selected by the underlying voting rule. In doing so, we ascertain that none of the interacting parties (neither the voters nor the talliers) learn the ballots of other voters, the aggregated scores of candidates, or any other information apart from the identity of the elected candidates. If, in addition to that output, it is desired to have also the ranking among the candidates, or their aggregated scores, our protocols can be easily modified to issue that additional information.
(3) Our protocols are immune to coalitions of size at most D, in the sense that no party, either a voter or a tallier, can gain access to the ballots or any other intermediate results, unless all D talliers collude with at least one of the voters. This is achieved by using a distributed tallier and implementing secret sharing techniques. The security parameter D can be tuned as needed, according to the desired level of security and the related computational and communication costs.
(4) We are the first who consider rational voting in the sense of submitting illegal votes. Indeed, the possibility of submitting illegal votes emerges from the fact that in our protocols all votes are submitted to the talliers under encryption, and the talliers aggregate them when they are still encrypted. Therefore, the talliers cannot check the legality of the single votes. We design protocols that can detect such cheats and, consequently, punish such voters and, hence, deter them from voting illegally in the first place. We would like to stress that in practical deployments of our protocols, submitting illegal votes can be prevented by the software that the voters run. For example, in the RANGE rule, if a candidate should assign to each candidate a score between 1 and 10, the software can reject votes that contain scores outside that range. However, motivated voters can cast a legal vote and then intercept the resulting encrypted messages that are sent to the talliers and replace them with alternative encrypted messages that convey an illegal vote. Therefore, the algorithmic mechanisms which we present herein for safeguarding against such cheats can be considered as an additional layer that comes on top of other, more basic, security mechanisms.
(5) The perfect secrecy of our protocols significantly reduces the opportunities of strategic voting.
Outline of the paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After reviewing related work in Section 2, we provide in Section 3 the necessary background on voting rules, as well as on homomorphic encryption and secret sharing (which are the main cryptographic tools that we utilize). In Section 4 we describe secure protocols for score-based voting rules, assuming semi-honest voters, and analyze their privacy and computational and communication costs. In Section 5 we discuss the extension of those protocols to the case of rational voters. Then, in Section 6 we describe secure protocols for order-based rules. In Section 7 we analyze the properties of our secure protocols and show that they are compliant with the standard requirements from electronic voting systems. We conclude in Section 8.
Related Work
In this paper we suggest to apply standard cryptographic techniques to some of the more well-known voting rules. As a result, our secure protocols ease the voters' concern for their privacy and can be used as a protection layer against strategic voting. To highlight our contributions, we begin by surveying existing work on secure voting and then survey other approaches to strategic voting.
Previous studies on secure voting focused on different desired properties, e.g. privacy, or anonymity (a ballot cannot be connected to the voter who cast it), uniqueness (every voter can vote once), correctness (the issued winners are the ones that should be selected by the underlying voting rule from the cast ballots), and fairness (all voters must cast their ballot without seeing other votes or intermediate voting results); see [13, 39, 57, 83] for other desired properties 2 .
Our focus herein is on preserving privacy and achieving perfect ballot secrecy. One way to achieve perfect ballot secrecy is by using methods that allow the voters to compute the outcome themselves without relying on a tallier to aggregate and count the votes, e.g. [9] . However, a self-tallying scheme cannot be robust and support perfect ballot secrecy at the same time [46] . Another way is to use a third-party, a.k.a a tallier. In order to secure the transition of the votes which are sent from the voters to the tallier, various cryptographic techniques were utilized in prior art.
Early studies used the notions of mix-nets and anonymous channels [15, 58, 62] . Blind signatures [14] were used in other secure e-voting protocols, e.g. [33, 41] . Chen et al. [16] proposed a secure e-voting system based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. Benaloh [8] proposed a practical scheme for conducting secretballot elections in which the outcome of an election is verifiable by all participants and even by non-participating observers; his scheme is based on secret sharing homomorphisms [7] that allow computations on shared data.
A large number of studies utilized homomorphic encryption, as it enables voting aggregation in the ciphertext domain. For example, Cramer et al. [23] proposed a scheme in which each voter posts a single encrypted ballot; owing to the homomorphism of the cipher, the final tally is verifiable to any observer of the election. Damgård et al. [24] proposed a generalization of Paillier's probabilistic public-key system [56] and then showed how it can be used for efficient e-voting. While most homomorphic e-voting schemes are based on additive homomorphism, Peng et al. [59] proposed a scheme based on multiplicative homomorphism. In their scheme, the tallier recovers the product of the votes, instead of their sum, and then the product is factorized to recover the votes.
In summary, previous studies on secure voting offered protocols for securing the voting process, e.g. by hiding the links between voters and ballots, or by encrypting and signing the messages with the ballots that the voters send to the tallier. However, none of those studies considered the question of executing the computation that the underlying voting rule dictates in a manner that preserves perfect ballot secrecy. We consider here two families of voting rules and propose secure multiparty protocols [35] for performing the needed computations.
There are different practical approaches for handling strategic voting. One approach is based on the computational complexity of strategic voting; this approach was first studied by Bartholdi et al. [6] , who showed that in certain settings it is computationally hard to devise a manipulation. Subsequent studies followed that approach and considered various settings of strategic voting [20, 21, 28, 30, 49, 53] , or sequential voting [26, 69] . A different approach that was suggested as a measure against strategic voting is to restrict the preference set. For example, if the preferences are single-peaked, voters have less incentive to vote strategically [25] . Another option is to restrict the voting process and request preferences in a way that makes it difficult for the voters to act strategically [54] . We propose to reduce strategic behavior by restricting the voters' knowledge. We offer to secure the ballots so that no one, not even the tallier, sees them, the intermediate results or any other computational outcome which is not the desired output.
The perfect secrecy of our protocols relies on the security of the homomorphic Pallier cipher [56] , as well as on the information-theoretic security of secret sharing schemes. In that regard, we recall a fundamental result of Brandt and Sandholm [12] that showed that such perfect secrecy must rely either on trusted third parties or on computational intractability assumptions (such as the hardness of factoring, which is the intractability assumption on which the Pallier cipher's security is based). Our protocols involve a distributed third party, T = {T 1 , . . . , T D }, called the tallier (T) or talliers (T d , d ∈ [D]). 3 The talliers aggregate the ballots and perform the needed computations, but they are not allowed to learn any information on the received ballots or any other intermediate computational result.
Background

Voting rules
We consider a setting in which there are N voters, V = {V 1 , . . . , V N }, that need to hold an election over M candidates, C = {C 1 , . . . , C M }. The election determines a score w(m) for each candidate C m , m ∈ [M ] in a manner that will be discussed below. Let K ∈ [M ] be some fixed integral parameter. Then the output of the voting algorithm is the subset of the K candidates with the highest w-scores, where ties are broken either arbitrarily or by the original indexing of the candidates. (This output as a subset may be augmented by the ranking among those K candidates, as induced by their w-scores. We focus here on the basic subset output. The extension of our protocols to the ranking output is straightforward.)
In the next two sub-sections we describe two families of voting rules.
Score-based voting rules
In this family of rules, every voter V n , n ∈ [N ], creates a vector of votes of the form w n := (w n (1), . . . , w n (M )), where all single votes, w n (m), are nonnegative and uniformly bounded. Define 
Then w(m) is the aggregated score of the candidate C m , m ∈ [M ].
We consider five types of voter inputs to be used in the above described rule template, which give rise to five well known voting rules [55] :
, is an m-dimensional binary vector of which the mth entry equals 1 and all other entries are 0. Namely, V n casts a vote of 1 for exactly one candidate and a vote of 0 for all others, and the winner is the candidate who was the favorite of the maximal number of voters.
• BORDA. w n ∈ {(π(1), . . . , π(M )) : π ∈ Π M }, where Π M is the set of all permutations over the set [M ] . Here, the input of each voter is his own ordering of the candidates, where w n (m) indicates the position of C m in V n 's order, and a position of M is reserved to V n 's most favorite candidate. This input type refines the former one, since here each voter gets to point out not only his most favorite candidate, but also the second, third etc.
• RANGE. w n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L} M for some publicly known L. 4 So here every voter gets to give a score to each candidate. This input type may be seen as a further refinement over the previous one, since such scores induce an ordering, but reveal also information about the voter's preferences which goes beyond the mere order.
• APPROVAL. w n ∈ {0, 1} M . Every voter submits a binary vector in which k entries are 1, while the remaining entries are 0. Such a voting rule is used when it is needed to fill k equivalent positions; for example, if k members in the senate of a university retired, it is needed to select k new senate representatives from the faculty.
Sometimes, k denotes only an upper bound on the of 1 entries in the vector. (In the above example, even if it is needed to choose k new senate representatives, a voter may wish to approve only ℓ < k candidates.) Such a voting rule falls under the above described framework, if each ballot is a vector w n ∈ {0, 1} M+k , where exactly k entries are 1, and the last entries represent dummy candidates. A voter that approves ℓ ≤ k candidates will submit a vector in which the ℓ bits that correspond to those candidates are 1, additional k − ℓ dummy entries are 1, and all the remaining M entries (real or dummy) are 0.
, is an m-dimensional binary vector of which the mth entry equals 0 and all other entries are 1. In this method every voter states his least preferred candidate. The winner is the candidate that got the minimal number of zero votes.
Order-based voting rules
In order-based rules, each voter's input is an ordering of all candidates (like in BORDA). The submitted orderings determine a score for each candidate by, e.g., one of the following rules:
is ranked lower than C m ′ , and all diagonal entries are 0. Then the sum matrix, P = N n=1 P n , induces the following scores for each candidate:
Namely, w(m) equals the number of candidates C m ′ that a majority of the voters ranked lower than C m , plus α times the number of candidates C m ′ who broke even with C m . The parameter α can be set to any rational number between 0 and 1. The most common setting is α = 1 2 . This is known as COPELAND 1 2 [29] . • MAXIMIN. Here, we define the matrices P n so that P n (m,
On probabilistic homomorphic encryption
A cipher is called public-key if its encryption function E(·) depends on one key, k e , which is publicly known, while the corresponding decryption function E −1 (·) depends on a private key k d that is known only to the owner of the cipher, and k d 's derivation from k e is computationally hard.
A public-key cipher is called (additively) homomorphic if its plaintext domain is an additive commutative group, its ciphertext domain is a multiplicative commutative group, and for every two plaintexts, x 1 and
When the encryption function is randomized (in the sense that E(x) depends on x as well as on a random string), E is called probabilistic. Hence, a probabilistic encryption function is a one-to-many mapping (every plaintext x has many encryptions y = E(x)), while the corresponding decryption function is a many-to-one mapping (all possible encryptions y of the same plaintext x are mapped by E −1 (·) to the same x). When encryption is applied on a small dictionary of possible plaintexts, it is essential to use a probabilistic encryption in order to prevent a known-plaintext attack. In our protocols, encryption is applied on small domains of plaintexts (e.g., the range {1, . . . , M } where M is the number of candidates). Hence, a deterministic encryption function is unsuitable here since any party could then generate the encryption of all possible plaintexts and then be able to decrypt any ciphertext.
The Paillier cipher [56] is a public-key cipher that is both homomorphic and probabilistic. Its plaintext and ciphertext domains are Z ν and Z * ν 2 , respectively, where the so-called modulus ν is a product of two large primes, p and q. The Paillier cipher is known to be semantically secure [56] 5 .
On secret sharing
Secret sharing refers to methods for distributing a secret amongst a group of participants, each of whom is allocated a share of the secret. The secret can be reconstructed only by combining the shares given to specific subsets of participants (called authorized subsets), while individual shares or even combination of shares belonging to non-authorized subsets of participants reveal zero information on the underlying secret. The collection of authorized subsets is called the access structure.
The notion of secret sharing was introduced, independently, by Shamir [66] and Blakley [11] , for the case of threshold secret sharing. Assuming that there are D participants, P = {P 1 , . . . , P D }, then the access structure in Shamir's and in Blakley's schemes consists of all subsets of P of size at least D ′ , for some D ′ ≤ D. Such secret sharing schemes are called D ′ -out-of-D. We are going to use here D-out-of-D secret sharing. Namely, only if all participants (who in our case will be the different talliers) combine all of their shares, they will be able to recover the underlying secret. Any other subset of shares reveals no information at all on the secret.
Assuming that the secret S to be shared is a bounded integer, we can view it as an element in a sufficiently large additive group, Z ν . In order to split the secret S among the D participants, the dealer (the owner of the secret) selects, uniformly at random and independently, D − 1 elements from Z ν , denoted S 1 , . . . , S D−1 . He then sets
. It is easy to see that the combination of all shares enables to recover the secret S, since S = D d=1 S d mod ν. However, any tuple of D ′ shares, where D ′ < D, reveals no information at all on S, since such tuples of shares distribute uniformly in
In our protocols we shall use such schemes to share vectors or matrices, where the sharing will be carried out for each entry independently. The dealers will be the voters, where the secret vectors or matrices represent their private ballots, and the participants among whom those secrets will be shared are the D talliers.
Secure protocols for score-based rules: semi-honest voters
In this section and in the subsequent ones we present secure protocols for implementing the voting rules that we described above. Our protocols are mediated, in the sense that they assume a set of talliers, T = {T 1 , . . . , T D }, who assist in the computations, but are not allowed to learn any information on the private votes of the voters. The number of talliers, D, can be any integer D ≥ 1. Higher values of D will imply higher computational and communication costs, as the latter depend linearly on D, but they will also imply greater security against coalitions of corrupted parties.
Our basic voting protocol is described in Protocol 1. It is a privacy-preserving implementation of score-based rules, i.e., PLURALITY, BORDA, RANGE, APPROVAL and VETO.
In the first step of the protocol, the voters jointly create a key pair in a Paillier cipher and let T know the public encryption key, while they keep the private decryption key secret. Hereinafter we let E denote the encryption function in that cipher, and Z ν denote the domain of plaintexts.
In Step 2, the voters choose a random indexing of all candidates which they keep secret from T. Then, each voter V n , n ∈ [N ], constructs his own vector of votes (Step 3), w n . In Step 4, V n creates random additive shares of w n over Z ν . Specifically, V n selects uniformly at random D vectors in Z M ν such that their sum equals w n . Subsequently, V n encrypts each of those share vectors by E and sends the dth encrypted share to T d , d ∈ [D] (Step 5) 6 .
After receiving the encrypted ballot shares from all voters,
, multiplies the received vectors component-wise (Step 6). Owing to the homomorphic property of E, T d now holds in his hands the component-wise encryption of the aggregated vectorŵ d = N n=1 w n,d mod ν. Each such vectorŵ d on its own carries no information regarding the votes (since it is the sum of uniformly random and independent vectors). But in view of Eq. (1) and the way in which the share vectors w n,d were generated (Step 4), we see that
where w is the aggregated vector of scores. The heart of the protocol is in Step 7: here, T, together with the voters, need to sort the vector w and find the indices of the K candidates with highest w-scores. This is a non-trivial task since no one holds the vector w; the different talliers hold only encryptions of additive shares in that vector, where the corresponding decryption key is held by the voters. In the next sub-sections we elaborate on how such a computation can be carried out in a privacy-preserving manner. Once those indices are found, the voters proceed to find the identity of the K candidates behind those indices (Step 8).
The only interaction between the voters is in making the two joint random choices in Steps 1 and 2. To this end, it suffices to generate a random seed that will induce the cipher keys and the permutation. Such a common choice is possible if all voters can communicate among themselves. This is a reasonable assumption in small-scale settings, e.g. organizational elections, but it is not suitable for, say, national elections. When considering large-scale settings, such a joint selection of randomness is possible if there exists another third party, different from the tallier, that generates the random seed and sends it to all voters. (Assuming an independent third party that is responsible only for generating randomness is common in privacy-preserving distributed computations, see e.g. [17] .) The main difficulty is in implementing Step 7. We proceed to describe three subprotocols for Step 7. The first one (Section 4.1) is the simplest and most efficient one. Moreover, it requires only two communication rounds. However, it does leak to T some information which in some applications may be considered sensitive. Hence, we proceed to describe two sub-protocols that are more privacy-preserving but are also more costly. The second one (Section 4.2) requires slightly more computations and O(M log M ) communication rounds. Its information leakage (to the voters) is insignificant and of no practical use, but as it is not information-theoretic secure we proceed to describe a third sub-protocol in Section 4.3. The latter is the most secure one since, with overwhelming probability, it leaks no information neither to the voters nor to the talliers. It too requires O(M log M ) communication rounds, but its computational cost is more hefty and might be translated into runtimes of several minutes. Since in typical real-life deployments of electronic voting there is usually no urgency to get the final election results, such delays seem to be tolerable.
Sorting encrypted vectors: sub-protocol 1
In this sub-protocol, each tallier T d , d ∈ [D], recovers his shareŵ d in the aggregated score vector w. To this end, T d selects some voter V j(d) and he sends to him his vector E(ŵ d ) under some secret and random permutation. V j(d) decrypts the obtained vector, component-wise, and returns it to T d , who applies on it the inverse permutation so that he getsŵ d .
Subsequently, the talliers compute w = D d=1ŵ d mod ν. This step can be carried out publicly, since each vectorŵ d is uniformly random and, therefore, holds no information on the votes or on the aggregated score vector. Then, the talliers find the top K candidates, for the selected setting of 1 ≤ K ≤ M , and they notify the voters of the indices of the K winning candidates. In doing so, the talliers can randomly shuffle the order of the K winners, in case the desired output is just the identity of the K winners, or maintain their ranking by the aggregated scores which they gained, in case the desired output should include also the ranking among those winners.
Privacy analysis
The selected voters gain no new knowledge in the implementation of this sub-protocol since each vectorŵ d , on its own, is uniformly random and therefore contains no information on the votes.
The secret random permutation which each tallier applies on the encrypted share vector that he holds is needed in order to prevent the selected voter from manipulating the votes. We assumed that the voters are semi-honest. However, if no permutation was applied, the selected voter V j(d) could increment the entry inŵ d that corresponds to his candidate of choice in an attempt to increase the total aggregated score of that candidate. The secret random permutation is a simple measure to prevent such actions.
As for the talliers, they receive the final vector of aggregated scores, w. While the random and secret permutation over C prevents them from linking any of the aggregated scores to any of the candidates, they will learn the aggregated score of the candidate who won, since the winner's identity is revealed. In addition, they may learn, for example, that there were two (or more) candidates that received the same number of votes, while some other candidate received zero votes. While in some settings such information leakage to a tallier would be considered insignificant, there may be settings in which such information leakage might be frowned upon. Hence, we proceed to describe a sub-protocol with a higher level of privacy-preservation.
Sorting encrypted vectors: sub-protocol 2
In this sub-protocol, the talliers sort the vector E(w), using any basic sorting algorithm, say quicksort. Any such sorting algorithm involves the verification of inequalities of the form
As the talliers hold only encrypted shares in the vector w, we proceed to describe how they can verify such inequalities with the help of the voters.
Before describing our proposed solution, we make the following observation: for each of the five score-based rules, there is a known upper bound B on the entries of w. B = N in PLURALITY, APPROVAL, and VETO rules, B = N M in BORDA, and B = N L in RANGE. Next, we recall a useful result from [72] , who proposed a secure division protocol. They showed that if x is an integer random variable that distributes over a bounded range, [0, B], and if ρ is a random multiplier that is selected from some special distribution, then the value of ρx reveals almost no information on x. The special distribution from which ρ is drawn is described by the following twostage process. First, we randomly draw a real number z ∈ [1, ∞) from the distribution Z on [1, ∞) with a probability density distribution function f Z (µ) = µ −2 . Then, we select ρ uniformly at random from the interval (0, z).
We are now ready to describe the manner in which the talliers can verify inequalities as in Eq. (4). First, they jointly select a random multiplier ρ as described above, and a random voter V j . (These two random choices are made independently for each inequality verification which is executed in the process of sorting the vector w). Then, each tallier T d computes We may assume that ρ < ν/2B (5) because the probability of selecting larger values of ρ is smaller than 2B/ν, and ν is typically a very large integer, usually in the range of 1024 bits, as is common in modern public-key cryptography. (In fact, not only that the probability of selecting ρ that violates condition (5) is negligible, if one uses 64-, 128-, or even 256-bit arithmetics to represent ρ, it is guaranteed to satisfy condition (5), because the right hand side in condition (5) is an integer of much larger magnitude.) Hence, w(m) > w(m ′ ) if and only if ρ · (w(m) − w(m ′ )) mod ν < ν/2. Therefore, V j may determine whether inequality (4) holds or not, and then notify the talliers of the result. That way, the talliers may sort the vector w even though they only hold encrypted shares of it.
Privacy analysis
As before, we divide the privacy discussion into two parts. First we consider potential information leakages to T, and then we do the same for the voter V j that assists in verifying the current inequality in each iteration of the sorting loop.
Due to the encryption E and the random secret indexing of the candidates, the only information that the talliers obtain during the protocol run is that there exists an ordering of the candidates, say (π(1), . . . , π(M )), such that w(π(1)) w(π(2)) · · · w(π(M )) ,
where the relation in each position is either > or ≥. They do not learn anything on the identity of the candidates (owing to the random indexing of candidates) nor about the exact scores (due to the fact that they only have encrypted shares in w).
However, we note that the ordering in Eq. (6), and the known bound on the values of the aggregated scores, can be used by the talliers to infer new improved bounds on those aggregated scores. Specifically, prior to applying the sorting sub-protocol, the talliers know only that, for every fixed m,
where B is some upper bound that is derived from the voting rule (see the explanation in the beginning of Section 4.2). Seeing the ordering in Eq. (6) and bearing in mind that whenever w(m) > w(m ′ ) then w(m) − w(m ′ ) ≥ 1, the talliers may infer new lower or upper bounds on each aggregated score that reveal new information which goes beyond the trivial bounds in Eq. (7) . However, as B ≥ N , and the information gap revealed by the ordering in Eq. (6) is bounded by M , and as typically M is much smaller than N , those information gaps (regarding bounds on aggregated scores of candidates whose identities are unknown to the talliers) are usually insignificant. As for V j , he does not get any wiser too because the talliers do not tell V j which two indices m and m ′ are currently compared. In addition, the value of the difference itself, ∆ := w(m) − w(m ′ ), is obfuscated by the random multiplier ρ. As analyzed and discussed in [72] , V j who recovers ρ∆ may infer from it very little information on ∆ because ρ is a random multiplier that was selected from the distribution that we described earlier. Specifically, if V j has an a-priori belief probability regarding the value of ∆, then his a-posteriori belief probability about ∆ might be different; however, as shown in [72] by theoretical analysis as well as experimentation, the a-posteriori belief probability offers a very marginal advantage, regarding the value of ∆, in comparison with the a-priori belief probability. (See [72] for the full analysis and discussion.) While such level of obfuscation seems to be sufficient for any practical application, it can be improved into information-theoretic privacy (with overwhelming probability) if we are willing to invest more computational costs. This enhanced privacy is achieved by the next sub-protocol.
Sorting encrypted vectors: sub-protocol 3
In sub-protocol 3, the talliers jointly select a voter V j and a secret permutation β over [M ] and then they proceed as follows. Each of the talliers T d , 1 ≤ d ≤ D−1, sends to V j his encrypted and permuted share vector β(E(ŵ d )). As for T D , he first generates a random vector r ∈ [0, ν − B) M , where B is the upper bound on the entries of w, as discussed in Section 4.2; then, T D sends to V j the vector β(E(ŵ d ) · E(r)). (Recall that since E is a public-key cipher, T D can compute encryptions in it, since he has the public encryption key, see Protocol 1's Step 1.)
After receiving all inputs from all D talliers, V j multiplies the received vectors componentwise, and then he decrypts the resulting vector. In view of Eq. (3) and the homomorphism of E, V j recovers the vector β(x) where
However, since the entries of r are smaller than ν − B, while the entries of w are bounded by B, we infer that
(namely, in the sense of integers), and not just modulo ν (Eq. (8)). Now, T D and V j proceed to sort the entries of β(x). To that end, they employ any sorting algorithm, say quicksort, which requires performing the verification of inequalities as in Eq. (4). The restriction on the entries of the random noise vector r which imply the relation in Eq. (9) allows performing such inequality verifications in a secure manner, as explained below. Once the sorting is complete, T D applies on the sorted vector the inverse permutation β −1 in order to recover the final ordering of w's entries.
Since
where the difference x(m) − r(m) is in the regular sense of integers, inequality (4) is equivalent to
The left hand side in inequality (10) is known to V j only, while the right hand side is known to T D only. The goal is to verify the validity of the inequality without disclosing to either party any additional information on the two compared values. That problem is an instance of the most fundamental problem of Secure Multiparty Computation -Yao's millionaires' problem [82] . In that problem we have two parties, Alice and Bob, each holding a private integer -x A and x B respectively. They wish to determine whether x A > x B or not, without disclosing any further information on the two private inputs.
There are many protocols for solving this problem with perfect security, e.g. [10, 31, 42, 82] . One of the simplest among those protocols is that of [10] . It has a minimal number of communication rounds -two. Its communication cost is quadratic in the bit-length of the two integers that need to be compared, i.e., it is O(log 2 ν). As for the runtime, it is dominated by the need to execute log ν 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer sub-protocols [27, 60] . The most common way of implementing a 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer involves four encryptions and two decryptions in a commutative public-key encryption scheme, such as RSA [61] . Namely, we are looking at a total of 6 log ν public-key operations.
Privacy analysis
The information leakage to the talliers in wake of performing sub-protocol 3 is as discussed in Section 4.2.1 for sub-protocol 2; namely, they receive the order among w's entries, as shown in Eq. (6) , and such an order may, in some cases, be used to infer new improved bounds on aggregated scores.
As for V j , since the random masks r are restricted by an upper bound, there is a negligible chance that V j may infer a lower or an upper bound on the entries of w. To assess the resulting risk of privacy leakage, we state the following lemma (the proof of which is given in the Appendix). 
Since ν is much larger than B and M (typical sizes of ν are O(2 1024 )), the probability of zero information leakage to V j is practically a certainty.
We note that as the talliers apply a secret permutation β on the vectors' entries, even if V j could deduce an upper or lower bound on w(m) for some m ∈ [M ], he would not be able to associate it with any candidate.
Computational and communication cost
In what follows we use the following notations:
• [Enc], [Dec] -the costs of Paillier encryption and decryption;
• L ν := log 2 ν -the bit length of plaintexts in the Paillier cryptosystem; 2L ν is the bit length of corresponding ciphertexts;
• [M ul], [Exp], [Inv] -the costs of multiplication, exponentiation and inverse computations in Z * ν 2 . Protocol 1 consists of two stages. The first stage, Steps 1-6, is the stage in which the actual elections take place, while the second stage, Steps 7-8, starts at the deadline for casting ballots (the time until which all voters can vote) and ends at the announcement of the winner(s).
The first stage (Steps 1-6 in Protocol 1) entails the following costs: M D[Enc] for each V n , (N − 1)M [M ul] for each T d , and N communication rounds (that can take place simultaneously), where in each such round a single voter sends D messages to the D talliers, each of which is of length 2L ν M bits. (Recall that N is the number of voters, M is the number of candidates, and D is the number of talliers.) The costs for this stage are of lesser significance since the computational effort is split between the voters, while the product that each tallier performs in Step 6 can be carried out gradually along the entire election period: each time T d receives a message E(w n,d ) from a voter V n , he can multiply it with the product of all messages that were received earlier.
The more crucial stage is the second one, since once the election period is over, it is desired to have the final results announced as early as possible. The computation of the final results is carried out in Step 7. We split the discussion to the three subprotocols that we suggested for that step.
In sub-protocol 1, the additional computational cost for each selected voter is M [Dec], while the additional computational cost for each tallier is negligible. The sub-protocol entails two more communication rounds, where D messages of length 2M L ν bits each are sent in the first round from the talliers to voters, while D messages of length M L ν bits each are sent back in the following round.
In sub-protocol 2, in each iteration of the sorting algorithm, the computational cost for each
Also, each such iteration has two communication rounds -one in which D messages of length 2L ν bits are sent from the talliers to V j and another where a 1-bit reply is sent back.
Sub 
Our measurements of the common Java implementation of the Paillier cryptosystem on a hardware comprised of an Intel i7-4600U processor and 16GB memory show that we may take X = 3 msec. Let us assume that D = 4. (We discuss the setting of D in Section 4.5 below; D = 4 appears to be a reasonable upper bound on the number of talliers in any practical implementation of our voting protocols.) Then the runtime of sub-protocol 2 is bounded by 21M log M msecs, while that of sub-protocol 3 is roughly 6144M log M msecs. Then if we wish to have the voting results within, say, one hour, then by using sub-protocol 3 that time limit can be met if M ≤ 90, while if sub-protocol 2 is used then we can meet that time limit for any M ≤ 12586. Note that both runtimes depend only on M and D, which are typically small integers, but are independent of N -the number of voters. Hence, both implementations of the second stage in Protocol 1 are very efficient.
Overall security of Protocol 1
Following the discussion in Sections 4.1.1, 4.2.1, and 4.3.1 on the security of each of the three proposed sub-protocols for implementing Step 7 of Protocol 1, we now turn to consider the security of the whole protocol.
An important goal of secure voting is to provide anonymity; namely, it should be impossible to connect a ballot to the voter who cast it. Protocol 1 achieves that goal since each cast ballot is first distributed into random shares and then each share is sent to a tallier after it was encrypted by the voters' homomorphic encryption. Hence, the talliers never obtain an access to the actual (cleartext) ballots and, consequently, cannot infer anything about the way each voter voted. The only way in which the ballot of a voter V n can be recovered is if all talliers collude among themselves and collaborate with another voter, V j . Indeed, the collusion with another voter is essential in order to break the encryption barrier, while the collusion of all talliers is essential since even if D −1 talliers collude, their additive shares in w n reveal zero information on w n .
There are two scenarios in which our protocols can be attacked. One is that all talliers and some voter form a coalition of D + 1 parties. Such a scenario is highly improbable, and its probability decreases as D increases. Indeed, the talliers would be parties that enjoy high level of trust within the organization or state in which the elections take place, and whose business is based on such trust (see the related discussion in Section 1.4). Betraying that trust may incur devastating costs and punishment for the tallier. Hence, we believe that if D is set to a low value such as D = 4 or even D = 3, then the probability of "a total eclipse of trust" in any conceivable application scenario (with a proper selection of the talliers) would be negligible.
Another possible attack scenario is as follows: a voter V j can eavesdrop on the communication link between another voter V n and each of the talliers, T 1 , . . . , T d , and intercept the encrypted messages that V n sends to the talliers (in Protocol 1's Step 5) in order to recover w n from them; additionally, V j may replace V n 's original messages that carry w n with alternative messages that carry w j (V j 's vote). Such an attack can be easily thwarted by requiring each sender to sign his message and then have the message encrypted by the receiver's public key. Namely, each message that a voter V n sends to a tallier T d in Step 5 of Protocol 1 should be signed with V n 's private key and then further encrypted by T d 's public key. Such additional measures of security are very basic. We elect not to overload the description of Protocol 1, as well as that of the protocols in subsequent sections, with such obvious implementation details, since they are not part of the actual secure multi-party protocol but rather an external enhancement.
In view of the above discussion, our protocols maintain the anonymity of all votes under the assumption that there exist at least one honest tallier among the D talliers. The tradeoff in setting the number of talliers D is clear: higher values of D entail greater communication and computational costs (where the dependence on D is linear, as discussed in Section 4.4); on the other hand, the protocol provides higher security since more talliers would need to be corrupted in order to breach the system's security.
A fundamental assumption in all secure voting systems that rely on fully trusted talliers (that is, talliers who get the clear ballots from the voters) is that the talliers do not misuse the ballot information and that they keep it secret. Our protocols, on the other hand, significantly reduce the trust vested in the talliers. Our protocols deny the talliers access to the clear ballots; even in scenarios where some of them betray that trust, the privacy of the ballots is secured. Such a reduction of trust in the talliers is essential in order to increase the confidence of the voters in the voting system to vote according to their true preferences, as discussed in Section 1.4.
5 Secure protocols for score-based rules: rational voters
Motivation
Protocol 1 assumes that the voters are semi-honest. However, it is not immune against so-called "rational" voters; by that we mean voters that follow the protocol but may submit illegal votes in attempt to help their candidate of choice. For instance, in the case of RANGE, each voting vector w n should be in {0, 1, . . . , L} M , where L is the maximal score that a candidate may get from a single voter. If a voter, say V j , wishes to push forward a candidate, say C m , he may set w j (m) to a value higher than L in order to affect the voting results in favor of C m . In doing so, V j must take into account the sub-protocol that is used for sorting the encrypted vector w (Step 6 in Protocol 1). Sub-protocols 2 and 3 (Sections 4.2 and 4.3) are much easier to manipulate than sub-protocol 1 (Section 4.1), since in the latter sub-protocol the talliers recover the full vector w, while in the former two the talliers only recover the ordering of w's entries.
Assume first that sub-protocol 2 or 3 is implemented. Then V j may set w j (m) to the value N L + 1, which is higher than the maximal possible value for any aggregated score in case all voters are honest. Such a cheat may grant the win to C m , if no other candidate was similarly pushed forward. However, if sub-protocol 1 is implemented, V j must be careful not to set w j (m) to a value that is too high, since if w(m) = n∈[N ] w n (m) (C m 's aggregated score) will be higher than N L (the highest possible aggregated score for any single candidate), then the tallierss will realize that someone has cheated and will terminate the protocol. Having said that, V j has a good chance of affecting the final voting results in favor of C m without being caught, by carefully choosing w j (m). For example, if V j has good reasons to believe that another voter is going to give C m a low score, say, no more than L/2, then he may set his fake vote w j (m) to 1.5L, so that C m 's final aggregated score w(m) will be still within the allowed range.
Similar options for cheating, without detection, exist also in the other score-based voting rules.
A protocol for rational voting
Here we describe an enhancement of Protocol 1 that could discourage voters from such illegal voting. The idea, which is borrowed from the context of rational secret sharing [1, 40] , is that the basic voting procedure is executed several times, which are called rounds. The first rounds are fake rounds and their sole purpose is to detect potential illegal voting. If such illegal voting is detected, the talliers abort the voting process. The voting results are determined only by the last and true round. The voters, who do not know upfront which round is the last (and therefore the true) round, are encouraged to vote legally since they know that if they submit illegal votes during a fake round it might be detected and they will be punished.
Protocol 2 is the rational version of Protocol 1. Each iteration in the while loop is one round. Each round starts with T selecting a random b ∈ [0, 1] (Step 3). If b ≤ φ, for some predetermined threshold φ, then that round will be the true and last one; otherwise, that round will be a fake one. We defer to a later stage the discussion on how to set φ.
Steps 4-7 in Protocol 2 are like Steps 2-5 in Protocol 1. In fake rounds (Steps 9-12) T check the legality of a randomly selected ballot; we elaborate on that checking procedure below. If a cheat was detected, T abort the protocol. If this is the true round (Steps 14-16), the protocol continues like Steps 6-8 in Protocol 1 and terminates. T select b ∼ U [0, 1].
4:
The voters choose a new random indexing of all candidates which they keep secret from T.
5:
Each voter Vn, n ∈ [N ], constructs his vector of votes wn according to the selected indexing and voting rule.
6:
Each voter Vn, n ∈ [N ], selects uniformly at random D −1 vectors w n,d ∈ Z M ν , 1 ≤ d ≤ D −1, and then sets w n,D = wn − D−1 d=1 w n,d mod ν.
7:
Each voter Vn, n ∈ [N ], sends E(w n,d ) to T d , for each d ∈ [D].
8:
if b > φ then 9:
T jointly select a random and secret subject Vn, and a random verifier V j , where n, j ∈ [N ].
10:
T perform a check of wn with the help of V j .
11:
If the check fails, the check is repeated vis-a-vis other verifier voters V j in order to ascertain that the first check was correct.
12:
if Vn cheated then T abort the election protocol. 13: else 14:
T d , d ∈ [D], computes N n=1 E(w n,d ) = E(ŵ d ), whereŵ d = N n=1 w n,d mod ν.
15:
T 1 , . . . , T D , together with V 1 , . . . , V N , find the indices of the K candidates in C with highest w-scores.
16:
The voters find the identities of the K elected candidates. 17 It should be noted that aborting the election protocol is a very harsh action. It can be followed by T pointing out the identity of the dishonest voter V n , and presenting his encrypted ballot E(w n ), as well as the identity of the verifying voter(s) V j . With this evidence, a judge can verify that either V n 's ballot w n was indeed illegal, or that V j sabotaged the verification of another voter's ballot. The harshness of such actions and the possibility to provide proofs against dishonest voters (either V n or V j ) is exactly the deterrent that we seek. As all voters are aware of the voting protocol specifications and are aware of the potential outcomes of attempts to cheat, they will be motivated to act truthfully (consequently, the chances of needing to abort elections are expected to be negligible).
However, the act of aborting the elections is not an essential ingredient of our protocol. Instead of aborting the election process (as Protocol 2 does in Step 12), it may continue the election process until completion while discarding the illegal vote (or votes), and output the identity of the dishonest voter and the evidence of his cheat, so that legal actions can be taken against that voter. The possibility of being detected and judged might serve as a sufficient deterrent on its own, even without the harsh action of aborting the elections altogether.
We believe that the aborting protocol is better suited for small-scale elections (say, elections within some organization among a group of colleagues or peers), because in such cases the costs of running the elections again are reasonable, and the fear of being detected (and potentially be expelled from the organization) seems to be a sufficient deterrent. The softer version which we described above, that carries out the elections until completion even in the case of detecting cheats, seem more reasonable for large-scale elections (say, national elections) for several reasons: (a) it is not feasible to run the elections again; (b) the aborting mechanism might be used by voters to repeatedly sabotage the election process (such "denial-of-service"-like attacks are unlikely in small-scale elections, e.g. when faculty members elect a new dean); and (c) the fear of being detected might not be a sufficient deterrent as it is in the case of small-scale elections.
Implementing the checking procedure and privacy analysis
We now describe the checking procedure in Step 10.
PLURALITY, BORDA, APPROVAL and VETO rules
The talliers select among themselves a random verifying tallier for the current round. Let us assume that the selected tallier in the current round is T D . Then each of the talliers T d , 1 ≤ d ≤ D − 1, sends to V j the vector that he received from V n -E(w n,d ), while T D sends to V j the vector E(w n,D ) · E(r), where r is a random vector from Z M ν . After receiving all inputs from all D talliers, V j multiplies the received vectors componentwise, and then he decrypts the resulting vector. Since we have w n = D d=1 w n,d mod ν, then by the homomorphism of E, V j recovers the vector x = (w n + r) mod ν. V j sends that vector to T D , who proceeds to recover from it the original voting vector w n = (x − r) mod ν. Now, T D checks whether that vector is a permutation of (1, 0, . . . , 0) (in PLU-RALITY), of (1, . . . , M ) (in BORDA), of (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) -a vector that has exactly k 1-entries and the rest are 0 (in APPROVAL), or of (0, 1, . . . , 1) (in VETO). If so, the check passes successfully; otherwise, it fails.
It is important to note that T D does not learn anything from this checking procedure on w n , because the entries of the voting vectors are randomly permuted in each round (Step 4), and the permutations are kept secret from the talliers. Hence, if V n submitted a legal ballot, then in PLURALITY, T D will always recover a vector which is a permutation of (1, 0, . . . , 0); in BORDA T D will always get a permutation of (1, . . . , M ); in APPROVAL it will always be a permutation of (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) (the vector that has exactly k 1-entries and the rest are 0); and in VETO a permutation of (0, 1, . . . , 1). Therefore, unless V n cheated, T D will gain no new information on V n 's voting vector. Of course, if V n did cheat, say by submitting in a PLURALITY voting the vector pe m , where C m is V n 's favorite candidate and p > 1 is the "cheating factor" (namely, V n tried to vote "p times" for his candidate of choice C m ), then T D will recover the value of p. However, by acting untruthfully, V n waives his right for privacy.
As for the verifying voter V j , he learns nothing from x, since that vector's entries are uniformly distributed over Z ν , as implied by the following lemma (see e.g. [70] ).
Lemma 2 Let w be a fixed value in Z ν , and r be uniformly distributed over Z ν . Then x := w + r mod ν reveals no information on w. Specifically, if P is an a-priori belief probability regarding the value of w, then for any i, j ∈ Z ν , P rob(w = i|x = j) = P (w = i).
It is important to note that V j has no incentive to cheat in this verification stage, since he does not know who is the voter V n whose ballot is being checked now. (It could be even himself, and then by sabotaging the verification procedure V j may incriminate himself.) Additionally, in case the verification procedure fails, the talliers will double check V n 's ballot with other verifying voters; consequently, V j 's cheating will be detected and V j may be then punished.
The RANGE rule
In the case of the RANGE rule, applying the same verification procedure as we described in Section 5.3.1 for the other score-based rules will reveal to T D the actual scores that V n gave to candidates, detached from the candidates' identities (owing to the random permutation that is refreshed every round and is kept secret from the talliers). Seeing this information, T D may infer that V n is, for example, a harsh evaluator of the candidates (if the mean score is low), or a diverse evaluator (if the standard deviation of the scores is large).
To prevent that, we perform for that rule a check of a single entry only. To that end, the talliers jointly select in each round an index m ∈ [M ]. Then, each of the talliers T d , 1 ≤ d ≤ D − 1, sends to V j the scalar E(w n,d (m)), while T D sends to V j the scalar E(w n,D (m)) · E(r), where r is a random value from Z ν .
After receiving all inputs from all D talliers, V j multiplies the received scalars and he decrypts the result. Since the share vectors, as generated by V n , satisfy w n = D d=1 w n,d mod ν, it follows from the homomorphism of E that V j recovers the value w n (m) + r mod ν.
Next, T D checks whether w n (m) is in the range {0, 1, . . . , L}. To perform that check in a secure manner, T D and V j engage in a secure set intersection protocol (see e.g. [32] ): on one hand V j holds the set A := {w n (m) + r} (which is of size 1); on the other hand T D holds the set A ′ := {r, r + 1, . . . , r + L} (where all additions are mod ν). The vote w n (m) is legal if and only if |A ∩ A ′ | = 1. Hence, by invoking a secure set intersection protocol to determine whether the intersection of the two sets is 0 or 1, V j and T D can determine the legality of the vote w n (m) and nothing beyond that.
Setting φ for motivating rational voters to cast legal votes
The parameter φ is the probability of any given round to be the final and true round. The expected number of rounds is then 1/φ. Hence, the smaller φ is, the larger the expected number of fake rounds and, consequently, the larger the chances of detecting dishonest behavior (or of voters being deterred from cheating in the first place). On the other hand, smaller values of φ imply less efficiency since a larger number of fake rounds will be carried out.
Let V n be a voter who contemplates cheating in his vote. Let -U t be his utility in case he acts truthfully in the sense that he submits a legal vote; -U f,nc be his utility in case he acts fraudulently and he is never caught (namely, his illegal vote does manage to affect the final scores of the candidates); -U f,c be his utility in case he acts fraudulently and he gets caught.
Typically, U f,c ≪ U t < U f,nc .
In addition, let q = 1 − 1/N denote the probability of V n not being subjected for checking in a given round. (We can reduce this probability to q = 1 − j/N if in Step 10 of Protocol 2, T will check j voters and not just one.)
then rational voters will be motivated to vote truthfully.
Proof. Rational voters will be motivated to vote truthfully if their expected utility from being truthful, U t , will be larger from their expected utility U f if they act fraudulently. We proceed to compute U f and show that if φ satisfies condition (11) then U f < U t .
Let (r 1 , r 2 , . . .) be the sequence of coin tosses that is generated in Step 3 of Protocol 2, where r i ∈ {true, false}, i ≥ 1. We have r i = true iff b ≤ φ. The probability of r i being the first true round (namely, r 1 = · · · = r i−1 = false and
A fraudulent voter will enjoy the high utility of U f,nc if he is not caught in all i − 1 fake rounds -an event of probability q i−1 ; he will endure the very low utility of U f,c if he gets caught in any of those rounds -an event of probability 1 − q i−1 . Hence, his expected utility from being fraudulent equals
Consequently,
By summing the geometric series on the right hand side we conclude that
It is now easy to see that the inequality U f < U t reduces to the one in (11) . That concludes the proof. ✷ 
The main computation occurs in Step 7 where the talliers, assisted by the voters, find the scores w(m) which the sum matrix P induces for each candidate C m , m ∈ [M ].
Finally, the identities of the K candidates with the highest w scores are recovered (Step 8).
Next, we discuss the implementation of Step 7 in the two order-based rules.
The Copeland rule
The talliers compute the score of each candidate, Eq. T generate M random and independent multipliers ρ m ′ , m ′ ∈ [M ].
3:
T select a random permutation β over [M ].
4:
T select at random a voter V j .
5:
Each
, permuted by β.
6:
V j multiplies all vectors received from all talliers and then decrypts. As a result he gets the vector (ρ m ′ · P (m, m ′ ) : m ′ ∈ [M ]), permuted by β.
7:
V j computes the number p of positive entries in the vector and the number z of zero entries. 8:
V j sends to T the value p + αz.
9:
T get w(m) = p + αz. 10: end for Privacy. The talliers learn nothing from this protocol apart from the scores of the candidates (whose identities remain secret to them). The voters learn only the scores of candidates, but they do not know who is that candidate (owing to the random ordering of the rows, Step 1), and which candidate beat which other candidate (owing to the random ordering of the row's entries by β).
To eliminate even those information leakages, we may enhance Protocol 4 in two manners:
(a) In order to prevent the talliers from obtaining the w-scores of the (unknown to them) candidates, the voters may jointly select at random an order-preserving cipher F (see e.g. [2] ) and then in Step 8 send to T the value F (p+αz); that way, the talliers can still find the indices of the K candidates with highest scores, without getting the actual scores.
(b) In order to prevent the voters from learning the scores of the (unknown to them) candidates, the talliers may add to each vector that they send to V j in Step 5 fake entries that will obfuscate the score of the mth candidate. Specifically, the talliers will decide jointly on the number of additional fake entries and their positions. In each such fake position, T d will add an entry of the form E(x m ′ ,d ) ρ m ′ , where x m ′ ,d is randomly distributed over Z ν and x m ′ := D d=1 x m ′ ,d mod ν is a value that T select randomly and independently from the range [−M, M ]. V j cannot distinguish between the fake entries and the true ones. Let p t and z t be the counts of positive and zero entries among the true entries and p f and z f be those counts for the fake entries. Then V j can compute p = p t + p f and z = z t + z f and send to T the value p + αz. Subsequently, T will subtract from that value the contribution of the fake entries, p f + αz f , in order to recover the final score. This way, V j is denied the possibility of recovering the score of the (unknown) candidate.
The Maximin rule
Here the talliers need to perform two tasks:
1. First, for each row in P , the talliers need to identify the minimal entry. 2. Among the M minimal entries that were found in the previous stage, the talliers need to find the K entries which are highest.
Those two tasks can be solved by any algorithm of sorting and hence, both reduce to the following basic problem: Given two nonnegative and bounded integers p 1 and p 2 , for which T hold only encryptions of their additive shares, how to verify whether p 1 > p 2 or not, with the help of the voters. Since in both tasks above, the values that need to be compared are always bounded to a known range, [0, M − 1], we can solve this problem as described in Section 4.2.
Privacy. The talliers learn nothing during this computation since they only have encrypted shares of P 's entries, and during the sorting procedures they only get from the voters a sequence of YES/NO answers to the oblivious comparison requests. As the voters have randomly shuffled the candidates, each such sequence is equally probable and, consequently, conveys no information. The voters, on the other hand, do not know which two values are compared in each query, and the difference between the two compared integers is obfuscated by the random multiplier (see the solution that we described in Section 4.2). Hence, they too gain no knowledge on the entries of the matrix P .
Comment. Also in order-based voting, rational voters may attempt to affect the results in favor of their dream candidate by submitting an illegal input (P n ) to the computation. Such dishonest conduct can be deterred by the same techniques as described in Section 5.
Compliance of the proposed protocols with required properties
Electronic voting schemes should, ideally, comply with some essential requirements. Below we list those requirements, as defined in Chang and Lee [13] . We discuss, in a theoretical manner, the compliance of our proposed protocols with each of the requirements. (Such a discussion of compliance with essential requirements is common in papers dealing with secure electronic voting schemes, see e.g. [18, 50, 51, 79] .)
In doing so, we assume that practical deployments of our protocols are enhanced with standard security mechanisms (as discussed earlier in Section 4.5). In particular, each party (either a voter or a tallier) should create his own pair of private and public keys, and get a corresponding certificate from a Certificate Authority. Then, each message sent must be signed by the sender and encrypted by the receiver's public key. In addition, each such message (a vote that a voter casted) must be followed by a confirmation of receipt sent from the receiver to the sender. Such security layers, which come on top of our protocols, are essential in order to prevent eavesdropping (e.g., V 1 eavesdrops on V 2 's communication with T in order to discover V 2 's vote), masquerading (e.g., V 2 replaces the encrypted messages that V 1 sends to T with messages that convey V 2 's vote), and other well-known attacks on communication systems.
Anonymity/Privacy. The votes should remain anonymous throughout the entire process. Our protocols achieve anonymity, as explained in Section 4.5. In particular, our protocols do not only protect the linking of votes to voters, they also protect the actual votes, as those are kept secret throughout the process and only the final election results are revealed.
Fairness. A fair mechanism does not reveal intermediate results. Our protocols are fair since the intermediate results are kept shared and encrypted, while only the final results are revealed. (The only exception is our sub-protocol 1, Section 4.1, in which the talliers get the aggregated score of each candidate. While this inconsistency with the fairness requirement is very benign, since the talliers are unable to link a score to an actual candidate, our two next sub-protocols, Sections 4.2-4.3, fully resolve that.) In particular, the fairness of our protocols imply that they are also resistant to strategic voting that may occur when intermediate results are available [54] .
Convenience. No special equipment is required and the voters do not need to learn any specialized technique. Our protocols are consistent with this requirement. Indeed, they rely upon basic and general-purpose cryptographic functions that can be found in many free libraries. Each voter may then download a very simple software package that can perform the standard cryptographic operations and communication vis-a-vis the talliers.
Robustness. No malicious intruder should be able to interrupt the procedure. This requirement is addressed by the standard security mechanisms, as described above, that should be implemented on top of our protocols.
Mobility. The mechanism can be implemented to run on the World Wide Web. Our protocols allow mobility since they require no special equipment and rely on very simple software.
Uniqueness. Each voter is allowed to vote only once. In all of our protocols, the talliers await until they receive a single message from each voter (see Step 5 in Protocol 1, Step 7 in Protocol 2, and Step 5 in Protocol 3.) Therefore, if one of the voters attempts to vote twice, only his first vote will be processed, while the second one will be ignored. In addition, as explained earlier, it is impossible for one voter to tamper with the votes of another voter since each message is signed by the sending voter and encrypted by the tallier's public key. Also, one voter cannot shoot down a message from another voter (in order to prevent the latter voter's ballot to reach the tallier) since the voter expects to get from the tallier a confirmation of receiving his signed and authenticated message. In case such a confirmation is not received by the voter, he can resend his message.
Completeness. Only eligible voters are allowed to vote. This requirement is achieved by the usage of signatures and certificated public keys.
Uncoercibility. A voter must not be able to prove to a third party how he had voted, in order to prevent bribery. Since in our protocols all votes are encrypted, and are aggregated through summation with all other votes in their encrypted form, it is impossible to present such proofs to third parties. The only scenario in which V 1 may convince a third party, W , of his vote, is if all D talliers send to W the encrypted shares of w 1 and W is one of the other voters and hence can decrypt that vote. As stated in Section 4.5, we make the very plausible assumption that not all D talliers will collude and betray the trust given in them.
Correctness. Each ballot must be counted correctly. Correctness follows directly from the talliers' semi-honesty (namely, that they follow the prescribed computations correctly). To ensure the talliers' semi-honesty in practical deployments, the talliers' software must be verified and authenticated, and it would be best to run it on a dedicated and tamper-proof machine (namely, a computer that is physically protected from any hacking attempts).
Efficiency. The computational load of the whole process is required to be such that the result is obtained within a reasonable amount of time. Our protocols comply with this requirement, as is evident from our cost analysis (see Section 4.4). Moreover, our protocols allow all voters to cast their ballots simultaneously, thus avoiding scenarios were voters need to wait for their turn or for correspondence from other voters.
Another requirement is the right for abstinence; namely, a voter that wishes to abstain should be able to do so without revealing that fact to any other party [39] . In all considered rules, each ballot is an array (a vector in score-based rules, or a matrix in order-based rules), and the final result is determined by the sum of the private arrays. Hence, a voter who wishes to abstain can submit an encryption of the zero array. Such an action is equivalent to not participating. Even the talliers cannot tell that a message received from some voter contains an all-zero vote, because of the secret sharing and encryption. Hence, our algorithms allow confidential abstinence.
Conclusions
We considered a setting in which a group of voters wishes to elect the top K candidates out of a given list of candidates, according to some voting rule. We designed secure multiparty protocols for that purpose; to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study that considers the question of secure multiparty computation of election results that such voting rules determine. Our protocols offer perfect secrecy in the sense that apart from their desired output (the identity of the elected K candidates), they keep secret all other information, such as the scores received by those candidates or even their internal ranking.
Such level of privacy may be essential in some scenarios. For example, when a prize committee needs to select K recipients out of M candidates, it is desirable to determine only the identity of the K prize recipients without revealing their internal ranking or the aggregated scores which they received. Furthermore, revealing the aggregated scores or even just the ranking might expose undesired information about the ballots. In scenarios where such additional outputs (ranking or scores) are desired, our protocols may be easily modified to issue such outputs with no additional computations.
We considered two families of voting rules -score-based and order-based rules. Within these families, we have shown how to securely compute the winners using the PLURALITY, BORDA, RANGE, APPROVAL and VETO score-based rules as well as COPELAND and MAXIMIN order-based rules. However, our protocols can be applied for any other rule that fits either of these families.
Our protocols are designed for both semi-honest and rational voters. The protocols comply with conventional security desiderata, and an analysis of their computational and commutation costs shows that they can be readily implemented in real world applications.
Our protocols are based solely on existing (and ubiquitous) cryptographic arsenal. This is a prominent advantage of our protocols, which are designed to be implemented in real-life systems and not to remain theoretical. Indeed, simple protocols that can be implemented on top of existing libraries are much advantageous over protocols which require the development and assimilation of new cryptographic components and, therefore, might be unattractive to practitioners and, eventually, be left unimplemented.
In this work we focused on single-round voting rules. In the future we intend to apply the techniques which we used here in order to secure multi-round voting rules such as Ranked Choice Voting (a.k.a Single Transferable Vote or Instant Run-off Voting), Plurality Run-off, Baldwin, Nanson, and Cup [86] .
